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This paper examines the impact of macroeconomic and financial sector policy announcements in the
United States, the United Kingdom, the euro area, and Japan during the recent crisis on interbank credit
and liquidity risk premia. Announcements of interest rate cuts, liquidity support, liability guarantees,
and recapitalization were associated with a reduction of interbank risk premia, albeit to a different
degree during the subprime and global phases of the crisis. Decisions not to reduce interest rates and
bail out individual banks in an ad hoc manner had adverse repercussions, both domestically and abroad.
The results are robust to controlling for the surprise content of announcements and using alternative
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1.  Introduction 
When the subprime crisis struck in the United States and especially when it spread to other 
advanced economies and pushed the global economy into recession, designing an effective 
policy response to the crisis became the number one priority for policymakers around the globe. 
The ultimate goal of wide-ranging central bank and government interventions was to address the 
fragility of banking systems and restore confidence in the financial markets. Achieving these 
goals required a delicate consideration of the sources of stress and the availability of suitable 
remedies―all against heightened uncertainty about financial and macroeconomic prospects. 
Reaching consensus on how quick and aggressive policy actions should be, how much weight 
should be put on macroeconomic and financial sector policies, and what specific form they 
should take, particularly given various legal, political and other constraints, has been a challenge 
both at the national and global levels (Swagel (2009)).  
 
The debate on what policy response would be most effective unfolded in real time, and first 
econometric analyses also appeared. They largely focused on the effectiveness of the Federal 
Reserve’s Term Auction Facility (TAF), with conflicting results (contrast, for example, Taylor 
and Williams (2009) and McAndrews, Sarkar and Wang (2008)). Some studies underscored the 
importance of the U.S. Federal Reserve’s commitment to provide unlimited U.S. dollar swap 
lines to other central banks in alleviating dislocations in the dollar swap markets (Baba and 
Packer (2009) and McAndrews (2009)). Announcements of financial restructuring measures 
were found to have reduced bank credit default swap (CDS) spreads, including for foreign banks, 
with the magnitude of the impact correlated with the magnitude of resources pledged (Panetta et 
al. (2009)).
1 The literature on the effectiveness of crisis policy response has been growing 
rapidly, with most analyses focusing on individual countries or specific policy measures.  
 
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we construct a detailed database of 
macroeconomic and financial sector policy initiatives announced during the crisis by four 
systemically important advanced economies―the United States, the United Kingdom, the euro 
area, and Japan―between June 1, 2007 and March 31, 2009. The database covers 
announcements in the area of fiscal policy, monetary policy (interest rate decisions, and 
quantitative and credit easing), liquidity support (in domestic and foreign currency), as well as 
financial sector policy (recapitalization, asset purchases, liability guarantees, and deposit 
insurance). It also contains information about decisions not to act (for example, to leave interest 
rates unchanged or allow banks to fail) and ad hoc bailouts of individual banks.  
 
Second, using a methodology common in the finance literature―the event study―we assess 
how successful macroeconomic and financial sector policy initiatives (as well as policy inaction) 
                                                 
1 Other studies assessing the impact of policy interventions during the current crisis include Artuç and Demiralp 
(forthcoming), Meier (2009), Frank and Hesse (forthcoming), and International Monetary Fund (IMF; 2009a and b).  3 
 
were in addressing the financial sector distress. Our main indicator of financial distress is a 
widely monitored measure of credit and liquidity risk premia in the global interbank 
markets―the change in the spread between London Inter-Bank Offered Rates (Libor) and 
Overnight Index Swaps (OIS) for the U.S. dollar, and we also examine the robustness of results 
to an array of alternative measures. We employ parametric and nonparametric means tests to 
evaluate whether policy announcements had an economically and statistically significant impact 
on interbank risk premia.  
 
The event study methodology has a number of advantages. The most important are its simplicity, 
parsimony and focus on the immediate market response to a policy announcement. Compared to 
alternative methodologies (for example, the regression analysis used, among others, by Taylor 
and Williams (2009) and Baba and Packer (2009)), event studies are designed to work with 
limited sample sizes. Although the basis of policy evaluation is narrow in an event study, it may 
be suggestive of policies’ long-term effectiveness as a positive immediate market reaction may 
be self-fulfilling, laying ground for a sustained policy success.  
 
Nonetheless, an event study has limitations. It does not lend itself to the analysis of causality. It 
also cannot provide a comprehensive evaluation of policy effectiveness. Such an assessment 
requires correlating measures of policy intensity and objectives over the entire policy horizon, 
while controlling for the effects of other policies and changes in market conditions. A 
comprehensive assessment of policies may reach different conclusions from an event study. For 
example, some policies which markets initially receive negatively (such as bank failures) may 
ultimately be welfare-enhancing (for example, by avoiding moral hazard) (Klingebiel et al. 
(2001)). A comprehensive assessment of crisis policies appears too early to be conducted at this 
time. 
 
The event study needs to be designed carefully to address several issues. The first challenge is to 
create multiple draws of announcements, which we achieve by classifying announcements by 
type and pooling them across countries. To ensure that the event window for an announcement is 
not contaminated by the effects of other announcements, we apply a number of filtering criteria 
when classifying announcements, exclude overlapping announcements and use a narrow five-day 
event window. We also explore the robustness of results to using a three-day window. We also 
examine robustness to controlling for expectations about the Libor-OIS spread and content of 
monetary and fiscal policy announcements (expectations data for other types of policies were not 
easily available).  
 
Although an event study cannot fully control for the multitude of macroeconomic and structural 
factors that may affect market response to news, we attempt to address this issue by splitting the 
sample period into two―the subprime crisis, prior to the collapse of Lehman Brothers, and the 
global crisis, after the collapse. We also undertake country-specific analyses to gauge the 
importance of differences in country conditions and characteristics of announcements. To ensure 
that we are not using a biased measure of financial distress, we test robustness to alternative 
system-wide measures of interbank risk premia, such as the recently introduced transaction-
based New York Funding rate (NYFR)-OIS spread, the spread between the Libor rate and the 
risk-free rate (the TED spread), the expected Libor-OIS spread, and the spread of repo 
transactions to the risk-free rate. We also consider a composite measure of bank-specific default 4 
 
risk (credit default swap (CDS) spread), and measures of market perceptions of macroeconomic 
prospects and financial market volatility (equity price and volatility indices (VIX), respectively). 
 
Based on the literature on past crises, both macroeconomic and financial sector policy 
announcements are expected to have a significant calming impact on interbank credit and 
liquidity risk premia (see Reinhart and Rogoff (2008); Calomiri, Klingebiel and Laeven (2005); 
Claessens, Klingebiel, and Laeven (2005); and Furfine (2002)). Financial sector policies aim to 
restore financial stability, while macroeconomic policies help to avoid the vicious feedback 
between the financial sector and the broader economy. Consistent with McQueen and Roley 
(1993), we expect market response to announcements to be state-contingent, i.e., depend not only 
on the surprise content of announcements but also on the state of the economy and financial 
markets in which investors interpret them. Owing to a high degree of integration of the global 
financial system, we would also expect to find evidence of international spillovers from policy 
announcements by systemically important countries.  
 
The announcement effects are likely to vary across types of policies. For example, although both 
monetary and fiscal easing aim to support activity, the impact of monetary easing on credit and 
liquidity risk premia is likely to be stronger as it directly relieves funding pressures and reduces 
counterparty risk. Unconventional policies are likely to show little impact on the spreads 
themselves, as their system-wide impact is more difficult to assess, although some institutions 
are likely to benefit significantly. Announcements of liquidity support, even if reducing funding 
pressures, may have an ambiguous impact if markets are uncertain whether the liquidity 
provision could mask underlying solvency problems.  
 
The introduction of government guarantees may have a larger immediate effect on interbank risk 
premia than asset purchases, because guarantees instantaneously transfer risks from banks’ 
balance sheets to the sovereign. Principles-based bank recapitalization programs are likely to be 
welcomed by markets, while decisions to bailout financial institutions in an ad hoc manner may 
have ambiguous effects. Although intended to allay markets’ fears about the stability of 
individual institutions, they may increase their concerns about the soundness of the overall 
financial system, as markets may consider that announcements about ad hoc bank bailouts reveal 
bad news that financial institutions are in trouble and country authorities are privy. Such 
announcements may raise uncertainty and information asymmetry about counterparty risk, which 
have been the main cause behind stress in interbank markets (Heider, Hoerova and Holthausen 
(2009)).  
 
The findings of this paper underscore that there was no silver bullet for containing the crisis. 
Both macroeconomic and financial sector policy announcements were associated with reductions 
in the Libor-OIS spreads, with market responses to announcements depending on the broader 
context in which market participants were interpreting the news. Three specific results emerge, 
which are robust to the changes in specification discussed above: 
 
1. Decisions to keep interest rates stable or raise them had adverse implications during the 
subprime crisis, while announcements of interest rate cuts contributed positively during the 
global phase of the crisis. Announcements of domestic and foreign currency liquidity support 5 
 
were mostly associated with reductions in interbank risk premia throughout the crisis, while 
fiscal policy announcements consistently had negligible effects.  
 
2. In the financial sector area, announcements of ad hoc bank bailouts had by far the largest 
impact, aggravating distress in interbank markets during the global phase of the crisis. This 
impact was not limited to domestic markets but spread throughout the global financial system. 
By contrast, systematic financial restructuring measures were more likely to be associated with a 
reduction in interbank risk premia.  
 
3. In particular, recapitalization announcements had a favorable effect on interbank risk premia 
during the global crisis, suggesting that markets saw merit in these measures. Liability guarantee 
announcements had mixed effects: reducing interbank risk premia during the subprime crisis 
(when they largely reflected the U.K. government’s measures in response to the Northern Rock 
case) and widening interbank risk premia after the crisis deepened (possibly because most 
announcements at that time were in response to the Irish move to offer blanket guarantees on all 
deposits and were associated with concerns about possible regulatory arbitrage and disruptive 
cross-border flows). Announcements of asset purchases were ineffective throughout the crisis, as 
markets may have anticipated problems in implementing these measures.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the Libor-OIS spread as a 
measure of credit and liquidity risks premia in interbank markets and describes the specially 
created database on policy announcements. Section 3 provides a brief overview of the event 
study methodology and describes how the event study was designed. Section 4 discusses 
graphical evidence and statistical tests of policy announcement effects for the pooled and 
country-specific samples as well as confirms the robustness of results to alternative 
specifications. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Measuring Financial Sector Distress and Policy Initiatives 
The analysis of interbank market responses to policy announcements requires daily data on a 
measure of financial distress in interbank markets and on policy announcements. Such measures 
are discussed below. The section also describes how the time period is split to control for 
differences in macroeconomic and financial conditions before and after the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers. 
 
2.1. The Libor-OIS Spread 
 
We measure the effect of policy announcements on the day-to-day changes in the 3-month U.S. 
dollar Libor-OIS spread―a proxy for the liquidity and counterparty risk premia in the global 
interbank markets. The Libor rate comprises the expected risk-free interest rate over a specific 
term, the term premium, the credit risk premium of unsecured trading with another bank, and the 
liquidity risk premium of term in lieu of overnight (McAndrews, Sarkar and Wang (2008)). The 
OIS rate is a measure of the expected risk-free interest rate over a specific term of secured 
transactions. Thus, the spread between the Libor and OIS rates over the same term quantifies the 6 
 
premium that banks pay when borrowing funds for a pre-determined period relative to the 
expected interest cost from repeatedly rolling over funding in the overnight market.  
 
In times of sufficient liquidity and in the absence of market dislocations, the Libor-OIS spread is 
close to zero. However, when markets are under stress, uncertainty about credit and liquidity risk 
creates an opportunity cost of term funding, resulting in a positive spread between the Libor and 
OIS rates. With credit and liquidity risks becoming the major drivers of the increase in the 
interbank interest rates since the summer of 2007 (Michaud and Upper (2008)), the Libor-OIS 
spreads turned into a widely monitored indicator of financial distress (Taylor (2009)) and a 
useful measure of the effectiveness of policy interventions (McCormick (2007)).  
 
When undertaking country-specific analyses, we use the Libor-OIS spreads for the U.S. dollar, 
pound, euro and yen. Although the Libor-OIS spreads for all major currencies moved closely 
together during the crisis, they are likely to be reflective of credit and liquidity conditions in 
interbank markets of the respective countries. Figure 1 plots the daily observations of the levels 
of and changes in the Libor-OIS spreads from January 1, 2007 to March 31, 2009. Spreads 
increased sharply in August 2007 (the “black swan” event of Taylor, 2009), remained 
persistently high through the rest of 2007 and the first half of 2008, and then shot up further in 
September 2008 after Lehman Brothers’ collapse. The collapse of this systemic institution 
aggravated distrust in wholesale funding markets, and banks became increasingly reluctant to 
lend to each other over longer terms. The above periods were associated with the largest day-to-
day changes in the spreads.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Although the Libor-OIS spread was widely used as a key indicator of financial distress, its 
reliability can be contested, for example, owing to major dislocations in money markets during 
the crisis and the role of central banks in displacing financial intermediation in wholesale term 
markets (Mollenkamp (2008)). Another concern is that the Libor rate tends to be calculated 
based on banks’ quotes rather than rates used in actual lending transactions.  
 
To confirm that using the Libor rates does not bias the results, we examine robustness to using 
alternative measures of financial distress (Section IV.B). Instead of the U.S. dollar Libor rate, we 
consider the recently introduced three-month NYFR, an interdealer-based analog to the London 
fixing of the unsecured money market in U.S. dollars, which reflects the actual funding cost of 
banks.
 2  (Similar data were not easily available for other countries in the sample.) We also 
consider several alternative system-wide measures of credit and liquidity risks― the spread 
between the Libor rate and the risk-free rate (the TED spread), the forward-looking Libor-OIS 
spread, and the repo risk-free spread ―as well as bank-specific measures of default risks 
                                                 
2 In contrast to Libor, which represents a quote of the benchmark rate of interest at which banks can expect to lend 
funds to each other in the London interbank market, the NYFR is the representative transaction rate at which an 
institution would be likely to obtain funding in the market. The NYFR was launched on June 11, 2008 by the inter-
dealer brokerage ICAP in response to market concerns about the accuracy of the LIBOR fixing and the panel 
composition of contributing banks. 7 
 
(composite bank CDS spreads) and measures of market expectations of macroeconomic 
prospects and financial stability, such as equity price and volatility indices (VIX). 
2.2. Crisis Timeline 
To account for differences in the macroeconomic and financial environment before and after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, we split the crisis period into two subperiods: (i) the subprime 
crisis  from June 1, 2007 to September 14, 2008, which was characterized by a series of 
predominantly central bank policy measures with a relatively narrow focus on arresting the 
downward spiral of counterparty confidence; and (ii) the global crisis from September 15, 2008 
to March 31, 2009, which witnessed frequent and diverse policy interventions motivated by a 
sense of heightened urgency about the need to restore financial stability and avoid a global 
economic depression.  
The onset of the crisis is identified as June 1, 2007 based on a Markov-switching vector 
autoregression of bond market data (see Nowak et al. (2009)). The end of the period coincides 
with the G20 Leaders' Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, held in London on 
April 2, 2009, when the leaders pledged more than 1 trillion dollars to tackle the global financial 
crisis by improving international finance and trade, and fostering an economic recovery. The 
collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 14, 2008 marks the end of the subprime phase and 
the beginning of the global phase of the crisis.  
 
Differences in the level of the Libor-OIS spread during the precrisis period (January 1 to May 
31, 2007) and the two crisis subperiods are apparent from Figure 1. Market responses to policy 
announcements are likely to have differed during the two subperiods owing to differences in 
market perceptions of the underlying problems, the nature of the policy effort required to address 
them, and the policy room country authorities had at their disposal. During the subprime phase, 
country authorities and markets perceived the crisis as largely limited to the fallout from the 
collapse of the U.S. subprime mortgage market and its implications for mortgage-backed 
securities’ markets. Policy priorities largely focused on the unfreezing of credit markets and 
dealing with weak financial institutions. Interest rate cuts and aggressive provision of liquidity 
support were seen as ways to address these policy objectives.  
 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers demonstrated the systemic nature of the crisis, at the same time 
as a sharp deterioration of incoming macroeconomic data pointed to global recession. Aggressive 
use of monetary and fiscal easing, while appropriate, gradually eroded policy room available to 
country authorities. Policy priorities during the global phase of the crisis increasingly shifted to 
restoring market confidence, preventing further systemic bank collapses, and stimulating 
domestic demand. During that phase of the crisis, interest rates declined sharply, and many 
central banks shifted to using unconventional monetary policy measures. 
 
2.3. Policy Announcements 
We compile data on major policy initiatives announced by country authorities in the United 
States, the United Kingdom, the euro area, and Japan in response to the financial crisis. Data for 8 
 
the euro area include policy announcements by the European Central Bank (ECB) and national 
authorities from Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain. 
Dates of policy announcements are identified based on official press releases, major newspapers 
and news search engines, and are double-checked against similar compilations of crisis events by 
central banks, investment banks, international organizations and individual researchers (for 
example, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2009); Furceri and Mourougane (2009); Global 
Financial Association (2009); Guillén (2009); and IMF (2009a and b)).  
 
To minimize noise and the number of overlapping events (which may bias statistical tests), we 
focus on watershed policy events. Such events are distinguished by the prominence of their 
media coverage. For the United States and the United Kingdom, we identify major policy events 
by their appearance as front-page news in the Financial Times and/or the Wall Street Journal 
within the symmetric four-day window around the official announcement. Given a greater 
diversity of the economic and financial press in the euro area and Japan, for these economies, we 
identify watershed events using additional news sources, such as Bloomberg and Associated 
Press, and the coverage in Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2009).  
 
Policy initiatives are dated as of their official announcement. For a few measures that involved a 
multi-stage decision-making process (for example, the adoption of a fiscal stimulus package), the 
consecutive stages of the process are recorded to the degree the authorities made public 
announcements at each stage. 
 
We distinguish ten categories of announcements in four policy areas: (i) fiscal measures; (ii) 
monetary policy; (iii) liquidity support; (iv) financial sector measures; and (v) policy inaction 
and ad hoc bank bailouts (Table 1):  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Fiscal measures include all policy actions that aim at stimulating domestic demand, through 
increases in expenditures or reductions in taxes, unless classified in other categories. Since fiscal 
measures typically require legislative approval, the political decision process is usually 
protracted with a series of announcements making headlines. 
 
Monetary policy measures include interest rate decisions and quantitative and credit easing, 
aimed at easing monetary conditions. Quantitative easing involves the central bank’s purchasing 
government securities, while credit easing consists of purchases of private sector debt in primary 
or secondary markets, including mortgage-backed securities.  
 
Liquidity support is the provision of domestic currency liquidity through broadened access to 
central bank refinancing, extended collateral framework, more frequent auctions, or longer 
maturities, as well as the provision of foreign currency liquidity through swap agreements 
between central banks and central bank funding facilities for foreign currency liquidity.  
 
Financial sector policies include the tools commonly utilized to resolve systemic banking crises, 
and are further broken down according to their implications for bank balance sheets:  
 9 
 
•  Asset purchase programs use public funds to buy risky assets from banks to shield them 
from losses. Banks profit from asset purchase programs to the extent that credit risk is 
removed from their balance sheets, and also because the purchases may put a floor on 
market prices in banks’ trading books. The category also includes ring-fencing of bad 
assets, which may be conducted either off-balance sheet through a special purpose 
vehicle absorbing assets, or on the balance sheet through asset guarantees. Asset 
purchases usually involve signing a loss-sharing agreement between a public institution 
providing funds and the bank receiving them. The measure can either be adopted for a 
single institution or as a system-wide facility for a given asset class.  
 
•  Liability guarantees are system-wide guarantees for newly issued or existing wholesale 
financing, and the enhancement of deposit protection schemes. It also embraces the 
lender-of-last resort funding to individual banks and other ways to grant financial 
institutions access to alternative funding sources, such as the chartering of U.S. 
investment banks as bank holding companies to allow them to tap retail funds. 
 
•  Finally,  recapitalization includes the direct injection of capital partially or fully 
originating from public funds, including the announcement of system-wide 
recapitalization programs, like the U.K. Bank Recapitalization Fund, and nationalization, 
which includes the assumption of a controlling stake in a bank.  
 
A special category—policy inaction and ad hoc bailouts—comprises decisions not to enact 
comprehensive measures to contain the financial crisis. The most prevalent policy announcement 
in this category is decisions to maintain interest rates unchanged. Interest rate increases, which 
were rare, are also included. The category also covers decisions to allow banks to fail—Lehman 
Brothers, IndyMac, and NetBank—and decisions to bail out individual troubled institutions. In 
contrast to the financial sector measures discussed above, a bank bailout is an ad hoc, 
unsystematic rescue package or nationalization plan aimed to prevent the failure of an individual 
financial institution. We use the adoption of a comprehensive recapitalization program or 
system-wide principles for bank rescues as the criterion for distinguishing between ad hoc 
bailouts and systematic restructuring measures.  
  
For announcements consisting of several measures, we identify the main measure based on the 
degree of prominence of front-page coverage for the measures included in the package, which 
also helps to reduce the number of overlapping announcements. For example, the FOMC’s vote 
to maintain the interest rate corridor on March 18, 2009, is considered less significant than the 
same day’s release that the Fed would purchase agency debt and treasury securities for more than 
one trillion U.S. dollars. In a few cases where several equally important policy initiatives were 
announced on the same day, they are included as separate entries in the database.  
 
All in all, the database includes 196 front-page announcements (Table 2). Financial sector 
initiatives accounted for the largest share of front-page announcements (38 percent), followed by 
policy inaction and ad hoc bank bailouts (23 percent), liquidity support (19 percent), and 
monetary policy announcements (15 percent). Fiscal policy announcements were just 5 percent 
of the total. The largest number of front-page announcements covered the policy measures 
undertaken by the United States (43 percent) and the ECB and the euro area governments (37 10 
 
percent). The U.K. front-page announcements accounted for 16 percent of the total number of 
front-page announcements, and Japanese, for only 4 percent, possibly reflecting a smaller direct 
impact of the crisis on this country with correspondingly fewer crisis-response measures taken. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Although countries’ approaches to stabilize the financial sector and support domestic growth 
were broadly similar, the exact timing and characteristics of measures varied depending on 
authorities’ perceptions of the extent and timing of crisis impact as well as local institutional, 
structural and political factors. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the front-page policy 
announcements over time, pointing to a considerable variation in countries’ policy responses to 
the crisis. With the onset of the subprime crisis, most countries stepped up the provision of 
liquidity support to financial institutions, but only the United States (and to a lesser degree the 
United Kingdom) aggressively cut interest rates during that period. The United States also 
initiated the first fiscal stimulus early on, in January 2008, long before the crisis took on its 
global dimension, while other countries announced fiscal stimulus packages much later, in the 
last quarter of 2008.  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Several countries resorted to ad hoc interventions to bail out troubled financial institutions during 
the subprime crisis, such as the bailout of Bear Stearns in the United States, guarantees to 
Northern Rock in the United Kingdom, and the rescue of IKB and two Landesbanken in 
Germany. The United States was the only country that employed a diverse set of financial sector 
measures early on, ranging from asset purchases to liability guarantees and recapitalization. The 
U.K. early response to the crisis concentrated on the provision of liability guarantees and 
changes in deposit insurance schemes, motivated by the need to address shortcomings in the 
latter. The euro area responded with a large number of recapitalization and liability guarantee 
measures only after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. In Japan, major financial sector policy 
announcements focused on recapitalizations. 
 
In addition to dates and types of policy announcements, we record information about the 
expected and officially announced intensity of some announcements. Data on officially 
announced intensity are available for fiscal, monetary, and financial sector interventions in the 
United States and the United Kingdom. For fiscal stimulus packages or asset purchases that 
imply (quasi-) fiscal outlays, we record the officially announced size of the package or special-
purpose budget allocation. Expectations data are available only for fiscal and monetary 
interventions in these two countries. For fiscal stimuli, market expectations of the magnitude of 
intervention are determined using news searches in the Financial Times and the Wall Street 
Journal within one week prior to the official release, and checked against the IMF’s internal 




3.  Event Study Methodology 
We evaluate the real-time impact of policy announcements on interbank credit and liquidity risk 
premia using the event study methodology. The methodology is well established, especially in 
the finance literature (see, e.g., Campbell, Lo, and McKinlay (1997); and Kothari and Warner 
(2007)). The event study methodology is generally well suited to assessing the short-run effects 
of policy and other announcements. Its main strengths are simplicity and parsimony. Compared 
to regression-based analyses, event studies are less affected by the problems associated with joint 
hypothesis testing―the difficulty of distinguishing whether insignificant test results are due to a 
failure of the efficient market hypothesis or a genuinely insignificant impact of announcements 
(see Jensen (1978) and Fama (1991) for a discussion). The event study methodology is also 
designed to work with the limited samples of announcements we have.  
 
An event study needs to be designed carefully to address several issues. To create multiple draws 
of similar events, we classify announcements into several types (as discussed above) and pool 
them across countries. We examine consistency of country-specific analyses with those based on 
the pooled sample. It is also important to ensure that the results for a given type of policy 
announcement are not driven by other events. Applying the front-page and main-event criteria 
for classifying announcements as described above helps to reduce the number of overlapping 
events. Furthermore, when undertaking the analysis on the pooled sample, we exclude domestic 
and foreign announcements of the same type which fall within five days from each other, with an 
exception of announcements of support packages where identifying the main event was difficult.
3 
Country-specific event studies exclude overlapping domestic announcements and tests of 
bilateral and total spillovers exclude overlapping announcements for the foreign country in 
question or all foreign countries, respectively. 
 
Limiting the size of the event window helps to avoid contaminating the analysis of given 
announcement effects with those of preceding and subsequent announcements in an environment 
where such announcements were made in relatively short succession. We use a narrow event 
window―one day before and three days after an announcement―while examining the 
robustness of results to using a symmetric one-day window. A longer post-announcement 
window allows for a more protracted-than-usual absorption of news, which appears appropriate 
as many crisis policy initiatives were unprecedented and/or complex, without any apparent 
benchmarks for evaluating their effects. This interpretation is supported by the graphical analysis 
(Figure 3), which shows a pronounced accumulation of announcement effects. Besides reducing 
the contamination of the event window with the effects of other events, limiting the event 
window also helps to reduce potential endogeneity between policy announcements and market 
responses. 
 
                                                 
3 They include 12 events in the United States (on 12/19/2007, 7/13/2008, 9/15–17/2008, 10/03/2008, 10/14/2008, 
11/10/2008, 11/25/2008, 1/16/2009, and 1/28/2009), 6 events in the United Kingdom (on 7/05/2007, 10/4/2007, 
11/08/2007, 10/03/2008, 01/19/2009, and 02/26/2009), 7 events in the euro area (on 2/13/2008, 9/29/2008, 
10/07/2008, 10/12–15/2008, and 10/20/2008), and 2 events in Japan (on 7/15/2008 and 10/31/2008).  12 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
Another aspect of the identification problem is that policy announcements may affect markets 
before the event window because they were anticipated. In this case, the policy measures would 
be priced out before the announcement, rendering insignificant estimates of the announcement 
effects. To account for such a possibility, we collect measures of the surprise component of 
interest rate cuts and fiscal stimulus packages in the United States and the United Kingdom (see 
Section 2.3 for details) and examine the robustness of results to using only the surprise content of 
announcements. Expectations data for other countries or types of announcements were not easily 
available. 
 
The last challenge, which event studies cannot address directly (by design), is controlling for the 
multitude of factors that may have bearing on market response to announcements. The event 
study focuses on the credibility of these announcements as well as market participants’ beliefs 
about their appropriateness, timeliness, feasibility and ultimate implementation. Market 
perceptions of policy announcements are likely to be state-contingent, depending on how 
markets perceive the underlying problem that needs to be addressed through policy measures and 
whether the announced policy measure is timely, appropriate, sufficient, and credible to address 
this problem. These considerations are likely to have differed considerably before and after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, and the splitting of the crisis period into the two subperiods (see 
Section II.B for details) helps to control for differences in the macroeconomic and financial 
conditions to some extent.  
 
Tests of the robustness of results to using alternative measures of financial distress also help to 
confirm that the main results are not biased. We consider alternative system-wide measures of 
interbank risk premia such as the recently introduced transaction-based NYFR-OIS rate, 
expectations about the Libor-OIS spread, the spread of repo transactions to the risk-free rate, and 
the TED spread. We also consider composite measures of bank-specific default risk (credit 
default swap spreads), and measures of market perceptions of macroeconomic prospects and 
financial market volatility, such as equity price and volatility indices (VIX), respectively. 
 
We analyze the impact of policy announcements on changes in the Libor-OIS spread, and 
capture the cumulative impact of policy announcements over a few days. The event study 
methodology requires aggregating the abnormal differences in the market indicator of interest 
within each event window to construct cumulative abnormal differences, under an assumption 
that no other factors moved the stress indicators during the event window. These differences are 
then averaged across types of policy to calculate average cumulative abnormal differences 
(ACAD). Focusing the analysis on short-term changes in the Libor-OIS spread avoids the need 
to model the time-varying properties of its level, including trends, structural breaks, 
nonlinearities and nonstationarity. 
 
We define abnormal differences as actual daily changes in the Libor-OIS spread. During both 
phases of the crises, day-to-day changes of the Libor-OIS spread were not statistically different 
from zero.
  Statistical tests based on an alternative definition of abnormal differences—the 
difference between the actual daily change on each day of the event window and the expected 
daily change measured as the average daily change over the previous 20 working days—point to 13 
 
the same conclusions as the baseline results. This is not surprising as the two measures of 
abnormal differences are highly correlated with each other.  
 
For other financial market indicators, which we consider as part of robustness analysis, the 
assumption of zero mean reversion is not valid. Abnormal differences are computed as a 
difference between the expected daily change of the market indicator and its actual daily change. 
The expected daily change of the market indicator, is estimated as the average daily change over 
the previous 20 working days, and is subtracted from the actual daily change on each day of the 
event window to obtain abnormal differences. 
 
We apply parametric and nonparametric tests of means before and after announcements to 
abnormal differences to ascertain whether the announcement induces a statistically significant 
effect on interbank risk premia. Parametric tests attribute an equal chance to both positive and 
negative deviations from expectations (in addition to allowing for asymmetric tail behavior of 
abnormal changes) while nonparametric tests do so without distributional assumptions. A small 
number of observations weakens the power of statistical tests, pointing to the need to consider 
both the economic and statistical significance of results. Statistical tests are specified in line with 
the literature, see for example, Patell (1976); Brown and Warner (1985); Boehmer, Masumeci 
and Poulsen (1991); Campbell, Lo, and McKinlay (1997); and McKinlay (1997). For a detailed 
description of test statistics, see Appendix I. 
 
4.  The Results: Impact of Policy Announcements on Interbank Credit and Liquidity Risk 
To gauge the response of the Libor-OIS spreads to announcements of policy interventions, we 
first plot changes in the Libor-OIS spreads during the event window and then test the statistical 
significance of differences in the behavior of the Libor-OIS spreads prior to and after 
announcements. We start with the graphical analysis and statistical tests on a pooled sample of 
announcements and the dollar Libor-OIS spread and then proceed to the robustness analysis and 
country-specific analyses on the Libor-OIS spreads for all major currencies.  
4.1. Analysis on a Pooled Sample 
4.1.1.  Graphical Analysis 
Announcements of policy initiatives had a small calming effect on the distressed financial 
markets, with the Libor-OIS spread falling by about 3 basis points on average during both crisis 
periods (Figure 3, top panels). In contrast, policy inaction (defined here as decisions to raise 
policy interest rates or keep them stable) and announcements about ad hoc bank bailouts and 
failures) were associated with a dramatic increase of the financial market stress during the global 
phase, yielding an increase of 46 basis points on average over the event window. 
 
This finding carries through to monetary and financial sector policy measures. The middle panels 
of Figure 3 underscore the adverse effects of maintaining or increasing policy rates, especially 
during the global phase. The Libor-OIS spreads widened by about 25 basis points on average 
over the event window in response to announcements of maintaining or increasing policy rates 
during the global phase. Announcements of interest rate cuts are found to be associated with a 14 
 
decline of the Libor-OIS spread. Such announcements were more effective in calming financial 
markets than announcements about liquidity support, especially when the crisis worsened. 
 
Among the measures targeted directly at banks, announcements concerning recapitalization were 
associated with the largest reductions in the Libor-OIS spread during the global phase (by about 
20 basis points on average over the event window). On the opposite, liability guarantee 
announcements were even followed by wider spreads during the global phase, as were asset 
purchases. Ad hoc bank bailouts and bank failures yielded a much worse response than any other 
policy initiative, with the Libor-OIS spread widening by almost 50 basis points on average over 
the event window. 
 
Policy actions led to a reduction of the Libor-OIS spread more often on average than policy 
inaction and ad hoc bank bailouts (Figure 4). Although the frequency plots for both policy 
actions and policy inaction and ad hoc bank bailouts are centered at zero (i.e., announcements 
had on average a negligible impact on the Libor-OIS spreads), the frequency distribution of 
policy actions is wider and more skewed to the left. This implies that announcements of policy 
actions led to a decline of the Libor-OIS spreads more often on average than policy inaction and 
ad hoc bank bailouts did (the respective probabilities are 58 percent and 32 percent, for the total 
sample period). The differences were particularly pronounced during the global phase of the 
crisis, as the probability declined to 3 percent for policy inaction and ad hoc bank bailouts.   
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
Announcements of both macroeconomic and financial sector policy initiatives were associated 
on average with reductions in interbank risk premia (Figure 4). The frequency plots for all 
categories of policy—monetary policy and liquidity support, financial sector policy, and fiscal 
policy—have long left-hand-side tails, containing a larger mass of observations than the right-
hand-side tails. This suggests that announcements in these policy categories tended to decrease 
spreads more frequently than increasing them. The average probabilities were around 60 percent 
for all categories of policies. Surprises in monetary and fiscal policy announcements were 
associated with declines in spreads more often (with about 77 percent on average over the entire 
sample period and 82 percent during the global phase). 
 
The effect of policy announcements on the Libor-OIS spread varied over the event window 
during different phases of the crisis (Figure 5). Although some fiscal and financial sector policy 
announcements were followed by lower Libor-OIS spreads during the subprime crisis, after the 
collapse of Lehman all types of policy announcements were accompanied by wider Libor-OIS 
spreads. The adverse impact of policy announcements on the Libor-OIS spreads during that 
period was rising over the event window, suggesting that markets were not just concerned about 
the ability of the announced policies to contain the crisis but that these concerns were worsening 
in the days immediately following policy announcements. However, throughout the crisis, 
surprises in monetary and fiscal policy announcements were associated with declines in 
interbank risk premia over the event window. 
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
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4.1.2.  Statistical Analysis 
Statistical tests confirm that while both macroeconomic and financial sector announcements 
were associated with a significant favorable impact on interbank credit and liquidity risk premia, 
the effects of announcements varied considerably across different types of policies and phases of 
the crisis. In contrast to announcements of policy initiatives, policy inaction and ad hoc bailouts 
had an adverse impact on financial stress in interbank markets.    
 
Monetary Policy. Interest rate cuts led to significant declines in the Libor-OIS spreads (by about 
11 basis points, see Column 5 in Table 3) during the global phase of the crisis. This was by far 
the largest impact among all types of monetary policy and liquidity support measures (Figure 6). 
More countries implemented interest rate cuts during the global phase of the crisis than during 
the early stage, the magnitude of the cuts was larger, and on one occasion interest rate cuts were 
coordinated by major central banks. The decline in the Libor-OIS spreads following interest rate 
cuts may have reflected markets’ expectation that lower interest rates would increase liquidity in 
the financial system, thereby reducing liquidity risk in interbank markets.   
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
We do not find evidence that announcements about unconventional monetary policy helped 
reduce interbank credit and liquidity risk premia, possibly because the likely effects of these 
policies were more difficult to discern than those of interest rate decisions. Although some 
institutions may have been expected to benefit significantly from unconventional policies, the 
system-wide impact of these measures was uncertain and difficult to assess.  
 
Liquidity Support.  Announcements of liquidity support were associated with reductions in 
interbank risk premia during both phases of the crisis. During the early stage of the crisis, 
announcements about the provision of U.S. dollar liquidity through swap agreements between 
the Federal Reserve and other major central banks (which often coincided with announcements 
about the provision of domestic currency liquidity support) were accompanied by statistically 
significant but small reductions in the Libor-OIS spreads (Table 3). Although the finding of 
strong announcement effects for forex swaps is consistent with other studies (for example, Baba 
and Packer (2009); and McAndrews (2009)), it is possible that the results partly reflect the 
effects of domestic currency liquidity support, as the respective announcements often took place 
together (for example, the Federal Reserve’s announcements on December 12, 2007). 
 
[Figure 6 about here] 
 
During the global crisis, the Libor-OIS spread declined by about 6½ basis point on average 
following announcements of domestic currency liquidity support, and this effect was statistically 
significant (Column 5 in Table 3). The provision of liquidity support seems to have helped 
reduce funding pressures for those institutions that had access to liquidity facilities, contributing 
to lower liquidity risk premia in the interbank markets (consistent with the findings in Artuç and 
Demiralp, forthcoming; McAndrews, Sarkar, and Wang (2008); Deutsche Bank (2009); and 
Christensen (2009)).  
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Fiscal Easing. Announcements concerning fiscal stimulus packages were not associated with 
significant reductions in interbank credit and liquidity risk premia, possibly because fiscal policy 
measures were seen as mainly targeting other objectives, for example, increasing domestic 
demand, and as likely to have uncertain and delayed effects on interbank risks.  
 
Financial Restructuring. During the subprime phase of the crisis, announcements of liability 
guarantees were accompanied by large and statistically significant reductions in interbank credit 
and liquidity risk premia (by about 11 basis points on average, see Table 3). This effect is likely 
to reflect the large guarantees extended by the U.K. government to depositors of a mortgage 
lender Northern Rock. The authorities provided stronger support for depositors than the latter 
anticipated (as manifested by the run on the bank) and also guaranteed wholesale creditors. The 
support of Northern Rock may have been viewed as crucial for reducing risk premia in global 
interbank markets, given the role of the United Kingdom as a major money center. Other 
countries used few liability guarantee measures during the subprime period and these measures 
were smaller in magnitude (Table 4).  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
In contrast, during the global phase, announcements about liability guarantees were not 
successful in lowering liquidity and credit risk premia in interbank markets. Spreads widened in 
response to such announcements, possibly owing to the fact that many announcements were 
implemented in response to the Irish government’s decision to introduce blanket guarantees on 
assets and were accompanied by concerns that such decisions would result in regulatory 
arbitrage and outflows of deposits to countries with more generous guarantees and deposit 
protection. In addition, unlike in the subprime phase, guarantees on impaired assets may have no 
longer been able to allay markets’ heightened concerns about the underlying soundness of 
financial institutions. 
 
Announcements concerning recapitalization are associated with a favorable effect on the Libor-
OIS spread during the global phase of the crisis (with the spread declining by about 3¾ basis 
points on average, see Column 5 in Table 3), even though this effect was statistically 
insignificant. This result supports the argument of Eichengreen and Baldwin (2008), made in 
early October 2008, that an urgently implemented, globally coordinated recapitalization was the 
key policy action needed to stabilize the banking system at that time.  
 
News about asset purchase programs were followed by an increase in credit and liquidity risk 
premia throughout the crisis, although these effects were statistically insignificant (Table 3). One 
possible reason for the more negative impact of announcements about asset purchases than those 
about liability guarantees and recapitalization is markets’ concern about the potential 
ineffectiveness of asset purchases―owing to banks’ unwillingness to realize implicit losses out 
of fear that participation in asset purchase programs would be interpreted as a negative signal 
about their soundness. Hoshi and Kashyap (2008) point to banks’ stigma derived from 
participating in the asset purchase program and their reluctance to sell the distressed assets at 
current market prices (below their fundamental value). 
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Policy Inaction and Ad Hoc Bank Bailouts. The impact of ad hoc bank bailouts of individual 
institutions by far outweighed the impact of policy actions during the global phase. Bailouts were 
accompanied by a 28¾ basis point increase in the Libor-OIS spread on average in that period 
(Column 5 in Table 3). The impact was also much larger than that of decisions to raise interest 
rates or keep them stable and decisions to let banks fail (Figure 6). 
 
Announcements of bailouts tended to send shockwaves through markets as they suggested the 
possibility of failure of a systemic institution (see, for example, Hoshi and Kashyap (2008)). In 
most cases, bailouts were carried out with constructive ambiguity about the government’s 
willingness to provide further support to banks—an intentional difference compared to system-
wide recapitalization and liability guarantee programs. Banks may have interpreted bailout 
announcements as evidence of forthcoming bad news about the soundness of other financial 
institutions amid increased uncertainty about the government’s intentions of supporting them. As 
a result, bailouts may have not been able to mitigate asymmetric information and uncertainty 
about counterparty risk―the main causes of stress in interbank markets (Heider, Hoerova, and 
Holthausen (2009)).  
 
During the subprime phase of the crisis, the effects of ad hoc bank bailouts were smaller and 
statistically insignificant (Table 3), possibly because concerns about counterparty risk were less 
acute and related more to idiosyncratic reasons such as weak bank management than the overall 
strength of bank balance sheets. However, decisions not to change interest rates or raise them 
resulted in a small but statistically significant widening of the Libor-OIS spread (by about 1¾ 
basis points, see Column 1 in Table 3) during the subprime crisis. 
4.2. Robustness Checks 
Event Window. To evaluate the robustness of results, we first consider a narrower event window 
(three days instead of five). This is a less conservative benchmark for assessing the 
announcement effects as it gives a higher weight to transitory effects. The narrowing of the event 
window does not affect the main conclusions, with the results showing a variation typical of 
event studies (Table 3). As before, interest rate reductions are found to have been associated with 
reductions in interbank risk premia during the global phase of the crisis. The findings concerning 
announcements of liquidity support are also confirmed. Announcements of liquidity guarantees 
are found to have reduced the Libor-OIS spreads during the subprime phase but not during the 
global phase. Announcements about policy inaction and ad hoc bank bailouts had large and 
statistically significant adverse effects on spreads during both phases the crisis, reflecting 
decisions to maintain stable rates or raise them during the subprime crisis and ad hoc bank 
bailouts during the global phase.  
 
Policy Expectations. The results are also robust to controlling for the surprise content of 
announcements. Consistent with the earlier findings, surprises in interest rate cuts had large 
effects on interbank risk premia during both phases of the crisis (Table 3). In the global phase of 
the crisis, the effect was statistically significant and by far outweighed the effect of monetary 
policy surprises during the subprime phase as well as the insignificant effects of fiscal policy 
announcements during both phases (Figure 6).  
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Although constraints on the availability and quality of expectations data prevent us from 
extending the analysis of surprises to other types of announcements, the above analysis provides 
some comfort that using dummy variables does not severely bias the results. Using dummy 
variables also seems to be appropriate as during a crisis both the expected and unexpected 
components of policy announcements are likely to have material effects owing to high 
uncertainty surrounding expectations and rapidly changing policy environment. As McQueen 
and Roley (1993) show, the effect of macroeconomic releases depends not only on their new 
informational content but also the state of the economy and financial markets in which investors 
interpret them. In normal times, policy announcements, for example, interest rate decisions, may 
be better anticipated (Bernanke and Kuttner (2005)). 
 
Alternative Measures of Financial Distress. Lastly, we confirm that the main results hold across 
alternative measures of financial distress. During the global phase of the crisis, all system-wide 
measures of interbank risk premia―the NYFR-OIS rate, the TED spread, the expected Libor-
OIS spread, and the spread of repo transactions to the risk-free rate ―registered an improvement 
after announcements of liquidity support, recapitalization programs and interest rate cuts 
(whether measured as dummy variables or surprises, with the exception of the repo-risk free 
spread) (Figures 7–9, Table 5). The mixed results for liability guarantees during the subprime 
and global phases are also confirmed across most system-wide measures of interbank risk 
premia. These measures also deteriorated following announcements of ad hoc bailouts and 
decisions to keep interest rates stable during both phases of the crisis. The effects of policy 
announcements on the measures of macroeconomic prospects and financial volatility (the equity 
price index and VIX) and bank-specific default risks (CDS spreads) were more mixed, reflecting 
differences in the nature of these measures compared to measures of the system-wide interbank 
risks. The latter findings are consistent with those by Baba and Packer (2009). 
 
[Figures 7-9 and Table 5 about here] 
 
4.3. Country-Specific Results 
Country-specific analyses shed light on the drivers of the pooled results. In this section, we 
discuss the results of the graphical and statistical analyses on the Libor-OIS spreads for 
individual currencies and the respective domestic policy announcements. We also examine 
bilateral and total spillovers from foreign policy announcements.  
4.3.1.  Graphical Analysis 
Plotting responses of the Libor-OIS spread to policy announcements shows a diversity of market 
responses to crisis-related policy initiatives across countries. However, policy inaction and ad 
hoc bank bailouts had a much worse impact on the Libor-OIS spread (the left panels of Figure 
10). This effect was particularly pronounced during the global stage of the crisis and most 
significant for the United States.   
 
[Figure 10 about here] 19 
 
Given the global nature of the crisis and close integration of financial markets, crisis policy 
initiatives taken by systemically important countries are likely to have bearing on market 
conditions in other countries. Similarly, policy inaction and ad hoc bank bailouts can affect 
financial risks in other countries. The graphical analysis of spillover effects on the other 
countries supports this hypothesis (the right panels of Figure 10). The spillover effect was less 
prevalent during the subprime stage of the crisis, given the small impact of foreign policy 
initiatives on the U.S. and U.K. Libor-OIS spreads. However, during the global stage of the 
crisis, international policy spillovers intensified. While foreign policy initiatives generally had 
few effects beyond the national borders, foreign policy inaction and ad hoc bank bailouts sent 
shock waves around the globe. The result underscores the strong policy interdependence between 
major systemic economies particular with regard to monetary inaction and ad hoc or 
unsystematic rescue packages aimed at single individual financial institutions which might have 
systemic relevance beyond national borders. 
4.3.2.  Statistical Analysis 
Figures 11–12 and Table 6 report the main findings of statistical tests of domestic and foreign 
policy announcements on the Libor-OIS spreads for the respective currencies.  
 
[Figures 11–12 and Table 6 about here] 
 
Monetary Policy. Aggressive interest rate cuts by the United States during the subprime crisis 
and by the United Kingdom during the global phase of the crisis were associated with significant 
declines in the respective Libor-OIS spreads (see Figure 11). Other countries either did not cut 
interest rates (the euro area and Japan during the subprime crisis) or did so much more gradually, 
possibly owing to concerns about reaching the zero-interest-rate floor (for example, the United 
States and Japan during the global crisis) and concerns about price stability and the functioning 
of the money market (for example, the ECB during the global phase). International spillovers 
from interest rate cuts were significant during the global phase, with all countries benefiting from 
the interest rate reductions undertaken by their peers (Figure 11 and Table 6). The Libor-OIS 
spreads declined most significantly in the United Kingdom in response to foreign interest rate 
cuts during the global crisis.  
 
Only the U.K. announcements about the use of unconventional monetary policy were associated 
with reductions in interbank credit and liquidity risk premia domestically and had some small 
(albeit statistically significant) spillovers to Japan and the euro area (Figure 11 and Table 6). 
These results may reflect the large scale of unconventional monetary operations pursued by the 
Bank of England and their narrow focus on purchases of government paper. The Federal 
Reserve’s unconventional monetary operations, while also sizeable, covered a broad range of 
instruments, aiming in part to support asset prices, particularly those of mortgage-backed 
securities. (The Bank of Japan announced limited purchases of equities from banks, while the 
ECB set up a small program to buy covered bonds.) A broad focus may have made it more 
difficult for markets to discern the effects of the Federal Reserve’s unconventional policies on 
interbank liquidity and counterparty risk premia.    
 
Liquidity Support.  Announcements of domestic currency liquidity support in the United 
Kingdom during the subprime crisis and the euro area during the global crisis were associated 20 
 
with significant reductions in interbank credit and liquidity risk (Figure 11). The provision of 
liquidity support may have helped to reduce funding pressures for those institutions that had 
access to liquidity facilities, and it may have lowered the liquidity risk premia in the interbank 
markets. In other countries, however, at the time of announcement, liquidity support measures 
did not translate into significantly lower Libor-OIS spreads for the financial system, possibly 
because markets expected that benefiting institutions would hoard cash or did not consider 
liquidity problems to be the main reason for bank distress. Further, central bank borrowing 
carries a stigma that significantly influences banks’ decision to use the liquidity support (see 
Furfine (2003)).  
 
During the subprime crisis, announcements about the provision of U.S. dollar liquidity through 
swap agreements between the Federal Reserve and other major central banks in response to 
global U.S. dollar shortages are found to have been associated with a significant reduction in the 
Libor-OIS spreads for the United States and the United Kingdom. The U.S. dollar Libor-OIS 
spread also benefited from spillovers from the euro area’s announcements about forex swaps. 
The results may partly reflect the effects of domestic currency liquidity support, as the respective 
announcements often took place together.  
 
Fiscal Easing.  Although fiscal policy measures were not targeting reductions in interbank 
spreads, they may have affected them to the extent that they were interpreted as evidence of 
political will to support ailing financial institutions. Statistical tests suggest that U.S. 
announcements of fiscal stimulus during the subprime crisis were not associated with 
significantly lower Libor-OIS spreads for the U.S. dollar, but had beneficial spillovers to the 
United Kingdom and the euro area (Table 6).  
 
During the global phase, announcements of fiscal stimulus packages by the euro area helped 
reduce the Libor-OIS spreads. (The euro area governments announced fiscal stimulus measures 
later than their peers as they expected automatic stabilizers to play a more significant role during 
the crisis. Coordination difficulties and the constraints imposed by the European Union’s 
Stability and Growth Pact also contributed.)  
 
Countries had mutually beneficial spillovers from foreign fiscal policy announcements. Stronger 
effects of foreign fiscal policy announcements compared to domestic announcements may reflect 
asymmetric information about the content and effects of domestic and foreign stimulus packages 
and more optimistic expectations about the success of foreign packages.  
 
Financial Restructuring. Approaches to financial restructuring varied considerably among the 
four economies in question, reflecting differing perceptions of the degree of bank 
undercapitalization, potential spillovers from other countries and feasibility and effectiveness of 
policies in the local institutional and political environment. During the subprime phase, liability 
guarantees introduced by the United Kingdom helped to reduce credit and liquidity risk premia 
in that country (a large effect both in absolute terms and in comparison to other policy measures, 
see Figure 11). As pointed out earlier, this effect can be traced to the case of Northern Rock, in 
which the authorities showed a strong commitment towards depositors. The United States and, to 
a lesser extent, the euro area benefited from this stance (Figure 11 and Table 6). In contrast, 21 
 
during the global phase, announcements about liability guarantees and deposit insurance were 
not successful in lowering liquidity and credit risk premia in interbank markets (Figure 11).  
 
Announcements concerning recapitalization were not successful in reducing the Libor-OIS 
spreads during the subprime crisis, possibly because they mostly addressed shortfalls at 
individual institutions. During the global phase, however, such announcements were associated 
with reductions in the Libor-OIS spreads in the United States and Japan. This finding 
underscores the high confidence-building effect of the recapitalization measures undertaken by 
the United States and Japan, especially considering their relatively small scale (Table 4). This 
effect may owe to the targeted nature of the recapitalization programs. For example, 
nationalization of the U.S. quasi-public housing government-sponsored enterprises, which were 
believed to be at the core of crisis risks, and the focus on banks’ equity holdings in Japan, where 
banks’ exposure to toxic assets was negligible and the main impact on their balance sheets 
stemmed from the declining values of equity holdings. The insignificant impact of 
recapitalization measures in the United Kingdom and the euro area may have reflected greater 
concerns about the rigor of stress tests used to determine banks’ capital needs in these 
economies. The euro area, Japan, and the United Kingdom benefited from U.S. announcements 
of recapitalizations (Table 6). Announcements of asset purchase programs failed to lower credit 
and liquidity risk premia, both domestically and overseas.  
 
Policy Inaction and Ad Hoc Bank Bailouts. Although policy initiatives had a mixed impact on 
the Libor-OIS spreads, the announcements of policy inaction and ad hoc bank bailouts were 
triggering wider spreads, particularly during the global phase of the crisis (Figure 12). 
Announcements of ad hoc bank bailouts led to the largest widening of the Libor-OIS spreads 
during the global phase of the crisis, both in domestic markets and overseas. In particular, U.S. 
announcements of ad hoc bank bailouts led to significant adverse spillovers into the U.K. and 
euro area banking systems. 
 
During the global phase of the crisis, international spillovers from announcements of policy 
inaction and ad hoc bailouts were often occurring in both directions. For example, such 
announcements by the United States led to a significant widening of the pound and yen Libor-
OIS spreads (Table 6). Likewise, announcements of policy inaction and ad hoc bank bailouts by 
the euro area resulted in statistically significant adverse spillovers on the Libor-OIS spreads for 
the U.S. dollar.  
 
During the subprime phase of the crisis, the effects of policy inaction and ad hoc bank bailouts 
stemmed from decisions not to reduce interest rates. These effects were small and caused few 
spillovers, possibly because concerns about the counterparty risk were less acute during the 
initial stage of the crisis.  
 
Having reviewed the effects of announcements by policy category, we now summarize them by 
country, again drawing on Figures 8–9 and Table 6. 
 
United States. Being the country where the crisis originated, the United States front-loaded its 
policy response to the crisis. It also employed a variety of policy tools early on, announcing 
policy measures in most categories during the subprime crisis, before it became apparent that 22 
 
U.S. housing problems would significantly affect the financial sectors of other advanced 
economies. However, with the exception of interest rate cuts and forex swaps, these measures 
were unsuccessful in reducing credit and liquidity risk premia in the financial system over the 
short run. The U.S. dollar Libor-OIS spreads narrowed upon U.K. announcements of liability 
guarantee measures and euro area announcements of forex swaps.  
 
During the global phase, the United States continued to announce major policy initiatives in 
nearly all macroeconomic and financial sector areas. However, only announcements of 
recapitalization measures were associated with reductions in the U.S. dollar Libor-OIS spread. 
The U.S. dollar Libor-OIS spread also benefited from foreign announcements of recapitalization, 
particularly in the euro area. The effect of domestic and foreign ad hoc bank bailouts (the latter 
largely stemming from developments in the euro area) was significant. 
 
United Kingdom. Like the United States, the United Kingdom introduced a broad range of policy 
initiatives early on. Announcements of liquidity support, forex swaps and liquidity guarantees 
were associated with a narrowing of the Libor-OIS spread for the pound. The impact of liability 
guarantees was particularly large compared to that of other measures, owing to their large scale 
(Table 4). Markets may have favored the use of liability guarantees because, given the large size 
of the financial sector relative to the economy, recapitalization on a comparable scale would 
have had a direct impact on the U.K. fiscal position, while liability guarantees represented a 
contingent public liability. The only beneficial spillover from foreign policy announcements for 
the United Kingdom was from announcements of fiscal easing and liability guarantees in the 
United States. 
 
During the global phase the U. K. authorities announced additional major initiatives in fiscal 
policy, conventional and unconventional monetary policy, liquidity support, and financial 
restructuring measures (recapitalization, asset purchases, and liability guarantees). Statistical 
tests suggest that of these, only interest rate cuts were associated with a significant reduction of 
interbank credit and liquidity risk premia. Announcements about quantitative easing and asset 
purchases also had favorable effects. The United Kingdom benefited from interest rate cuts by 
the euro area and Japan and, like before, announcements of liability guarantees by the United 
States. 
 
Euro area. Policy response by the euro area was largely back-loaded to the global phase of the 
crisis. During the subprime phase policy announcements did not result in significant reductions 
in the Libor-OIS spreads for the euro. The euro area benefited, however, from the U.S. 
announcements of fiscal stimulus and the U.K. announcements of liability guarantees and 
recapitalization (Table 6). During the global phase, domestic announcements of fiscal easing 
were associated with reductions in interbank credit and liquidity risk premia.  
 
While foreign bank bailouts had some uneven and, in comparison to other countries, smaller 
effects, bank bailouts within the euro area were associated with higher spreads, albeit to a lesser 
extent than similar events in the United States. Announcements of other financial sector 
measures, particularly recapitalization programs and liability guarantees, were followed by wider 
spreads, although this result is not statistically significant. Although such a response was found 
for the United Kingdom too, for the euro area it may have reflected a limited integration of the 23 
 
crisis response, with most recapitalization and liability guarantee measures targeted at selected 
national banks. Insufficient coordination may explain the detrimental effect of the respective 
announcements on the Libor-OIS spread, triggering a response that is qualitatively similar (albeit 
smaller) than that of ad hoc bank bailouts. 
 
Japan. None of the policy measures used by Japan during the subprime crisis were front-page 
events, and foreign announcements of policy initiatives did not have a material impact on the yen 
Libor-OIS spread during that period. During the global phase of the crisis, announcements of 
fiscal easing and recapitalization helped reduce credit and liquidity risk premia in the financial 
system. Japan benefited from foreign policy initiatives in several areas, for example, interest rate 
cuts and quantitative easing by the United Kingdom, as well as U.S. fiscal easing and 
recapitalization.  
 
5.  Conclusions 
An immediate positive market response to announcements of policy initiatives during a financial 
crisis may be self-fulfilling and indicative of whether these initiatives would help to restore 
confidence. This paper examined the global crisis through the lens of interbank markets’ 
immediate response to announcements of macroeconomic and financial sector policy initiatives 
in systemically important advanced economies. The analysis drew on a unique database of policy 
announcements and a standard event study methodology, with the findings supported through the 
gamut of robustness checks. The following broad policy implications emerge from the study:  
 
(a) A systemic financial crisis requires an integrated macro-financial policy response. The paper 
does not find strong evidence that either macroeconomic or financial policies had an advantage 
in calming interbank markets. The study does not point to a policy silver bullet that could have 
been expected to contain the crisis.  
 
(b) A coordinated policy response is required to restore market confidence during a global 
crisis. The paper finds that foreign policy initiatives had significant bearing on credit and 
liquidity risk premia in domestic interbank markets. International spillovers of policy 
announcements intensified as the crisis deepened.  
 
(c) Some policy decisions, for example, decisions not to reduce interest rate, to allow banks to 
fail, or ad hoc bank bailouts tend to increase credit and liquidity risk premia. This is one of the 
strongest and most consistent results in the paper. This is one of the strongest and most 
consistent results in the paper, which underscores the importance of a comprehensive approach 
to financial crisis resolution. Policy actions that are perceived as ad hoc or targeted at individual 
systemic institutions tend to exacerbate market fears, even if they are well intentioned from the 
long-run perspective, for example, aim to prevent moral hazard. 
 
Results need to be taken with caution as they do not provide a comprehensive assessment of 
policy effectiveness. The study focuses on an immediate market response to policy 
announcements, which tends to have bearing on but may not be always indicative of the long-
term effectiveness of policies. It emphasizes the effectiveness of policy announcements in 24 
 
breaking adverse trends in global interbank markets during the financial crisis, which was 







Interest rate cuts Coordinated rate cut by six central banks (10/8/2008)
Gilt purchases (3/5/09), BoJ outright JGB purchases (1/22/09, 3/19/09), Federal Reserve buys long-term Treasuries (3/18/09)
BoE asset purchase facility (1/19/09), U.K. Corporate Bond Secondary Market Purchase Scheme and CP Facility (3/5/09), BoJ 
purchase of corporate financing instruments (1/22/09, 2/19/09), Fed purchases agency debt and MBS (3/18/09), ECB purchase 
of covered bonds (5/7/09)
Liquidity support
Relaxation of collateral 
framework; change in funding 
terms or auction schedule
U.S. Term Auction Facility (12/12/07, 12/21/07), launch of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF, 3/3/09), 
ECB’s expansion of the collateral framework (10/15/08), lengthening of the terms (8/22/07) and introduction of additional 
auctions (12/17/07), U.K. Special Liquidity Scheme (4/21/2008, extended 9/17/2008), U.K. long-term repo with expanded 
collateral (10/3/08)
Support of money markets Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) Money Market Fund Liquidity Facility (9/19/08)
Foreign currency swaps FX swaps and FX funding ECB offers dollar funding (12/12/07)
Financial sector policies
Asset purchases Troubled Assets Relief Program (10/3/08), Spain’s fund to buy impaired assets (10/7/08)
Ring-fencing of bad assets 
and asset guarantees
Maiden Lane SPVs for buying impaired assets (Bear Stearns, 3/14/08; AIG, 11/10/08), SPV WestLB (2/6/08), French loan 
guarantees (10/13/08), asset guarantees to Citi (11/23/08) and BofA (1/16/09), UK Asset Protection Scheme (1/19/09)
Guarantees for old or new 
liabilities
Irish Government Guarantee Scheme (9/30/08), U.K. Credit Guarantee Scheme (10/8/08), U.S. Temporary Liquidity Guarantee 
Program (10/14/08)
Enhancement of depositor 
protection
Ireland (9/20/2008), U.K. (10/3/08), Germany (10/5/08),  U.S. extension to credit unions (1/28/09)
Provision of lender of last 
resort facilities to individual 
banks
Northern Rock liquidity support facility (9/14/07), Hypo Real Estate rescue (9/29/08), Federal Reserve Board's acceptance of 
applications to be chartered as bank holding companies (e.g., Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, 9/21/08)
Recapitalization Capital injection and 
nationalization
TARP capitalization of nine U.S. banks (10/28/08), subordinated debt for six French banks (10/20/08), U.K. Bank 
Recapitalization Fund (10/8/08 and subsequent capital injections in October 2008 and February/March 2009)
Interest rate increases and 
decisions to maintain interest 
rates unchanged
Policy rates maintained (e.g., ECB 10/2/2008, BoE 11/8/2007, FOMC 9/16/2008) or increased (e.g., ECB 7/3/2008)
Ad hoc bank bailouts IKB (8/2/07, 2/13/08), SachsenLB (8/26/07), Northern Rock (11/19/07, 2/17/08), Bear Stearns (3/14/08), Fannie Mae and 
Fredie Mac (9/7/08), Merrill Lynch (9/15/08, 11/26/08), WaMu (9/25/08), Bradford and Bingley (9/29/08), Fortis (9/29/08), Dexia 
(9/30/08), Wachovia (10/12/08)
Bank failures NetBank (9/30/07), IndyMac (7/11/08), Lehman Brothers (9/15/08)
Source: Authors.
Table 1. Classification of Policy Measures




Policy inaction and ad hoc bank bailouts
Fiscal policy Fiscal stimulus packages German Pact for Employment and Stability (1/14/09), Stimulus plan announced by President Sarkozy (12/4/08), U.K. stimulus 
package (11/24/08), U.S. Economic Stimulus Act (1/18/08, 1/24/08, 1/29/08)
Quantitative and credit easing
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United States United Kingdom Euro Area Japan Total
As a Percentage of 
All Front-Page 
Announcements
Fiscal Policy 6 1 2 1 10 5
Monetary Policy 12 9 5 3 29 15
      Interest rate cuts 10 7 5 1 23 12
     Quantitative and credit easing 2 2 026 3
Liquidity Support 19 3 14 1 37 19
      Domestic currency liquidity support 16 2 9 1 28 14
      Foreign currency swaps 3 1 509 5
Financial Sector Policies 29 12 32 1 74 38
      Asset Purchases 931 0 1 37
      Liability Guarantees 8 4 1 702 9 1 5
      Recapitalization 1 2 5 1 413 2 1 6
Policy Inaction and Ad Hoc Bank Bailouts 18 6 20 2 46 23
      Interest rate decisions 5 3 1 322 3 1 2
      Bank Bailouts and Assisted Mergers 837 0 1 89
      Bank Failures 3 0 003 2
      Other 2 0 002 1
Total number of front-page events 84 31 73 8 196 100
As a percentage of total number of front-
page announcements
43 16 37 4 100
Source: Authors.
Table 2. Number of Front-Page Policy Announcements, June 1, 2007–March 31, 2009
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fiscal policy 0.70 -0.50 — 1 -0.68 0.27 — 7
Monetary policy
Interest rate cuts -1.30 0.34 — 9 -11.16 2.77 *** 7
Quantitative and credit easing — — — 0 1.50 -0.71 — 2
Liquidity support
Domestic currency 2.71 -0.42 — 11 -6.40 1.32 * 3
Forex swaps -4.14 1.03 * 4 39.64 -0.50 — 1
Financial Sector Policy
Recapitalization — — — 0 -3.71 0.76 — 20
Asset purchases 9.82 -0.50 — 1 3.31 -0.50 — 4
Liability guarantees -10.90 2.60 *** 3 9.88 -1.14 — 16
Policy inaction and ad hoc bank bailouts 1.43 -1.41 *** 23 25.50 -1.50 *** 9
Higher/stable interest rates 1.79 -1.16 ** 15 1.44 -0.50 — 1
Ad hoc bank bailouts 0.62 -0.59 — 6 28.65 -1.32 *** 7
Bank failures 1.15 -0.59 — 2 27.54 -0.50 — 1
Surprises
Fiscal policy — — — 0 0.39 -0.16 — 3
Monetary policy -4.45 0.19 — 3 -13.18 3.34 *** 5
Fiscal policy -2.01 1.50 * 1 -0.76 0.29 — 7
Monetary policy
Interest rate cuts -0.42 0.13 — 9 -6.30 2.46 *** 7
Quantitative and credit easing — — — 0 0.80 -0.27 — 2
Liquidity support
Domestic currency 3.27 -0.74 — 11 -8.64 1.43 * 3
Forex swaps -3.59 3.00 * 4 26.03 -0.50 — 1
Financial Sector Policy
Recapitalization — — — 0 -0.81 0.13 — 20
Asset purchases 7.21 -0.50 — 1 -1.04 -0.13 — 4
Liability guarantees -6.91 2.60 *** 3 5.32 -0.96 — 16
Policy inaction and ad hoc bank bailouts 0.53 -0.79 * 23 19.14 -1.50 *** 9
Higher/stable interest rates 0.82 -1.02 * 15 1.50 -0.50 — 1
Ad hoc bank bailouts -0.39 0.31 — 6 22.48 -1.32 *** 7
Bank failures 1.12 -0.39 — 2 13.33 -0.50 — 1
Surprises
Fiscal policy — — — 0 0.39 -0.16 — 3
Monetary policy -4.45 0.19 — 3 -13.18 3.35 *** 5
Source: Authors' estimates.
Parametric Test Non-parametric Test Parametric Test Non-parametric Test
Note: The table reports test statistics for the parametric test based on the Average Cumulative Abnormal Differences (ACAD) and the sign-size nonparametric test, respectively (for more details on the test statistics, 
see Appendix I). The results of the parametric tests using the Average Abnormal Differences (AAD) and the Average Standardized Interval Prediction Errors (ASIPE) as well as the sign nonparametric test are 
available upon request. All tests are performed on a pooled sample of policy announcements and the U.S. dollar 3-month Libor-OIS spread. Asterisks ***,**,* indicate statistical significance (two-tailed, standard 
normal distribution) at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. Statistical significance is assigned if all parametric and non-parametric tests are consonant with each other at the significance level of at least 10 
percent; the lowest value of the test statistics is used. The peak-to-trough change in the Libor-OIS spread was 79.17 basis points during the subprime phase (with a daily average change of 0.18 basis points and a 
standard deviation of 1.02 basis points) and 141.19 basis points during the global phase of the financial crisis (with daily average change of 0.15 basis points and a standard deviation of 2.80 basis points) . 





Subprime Phase Global Phase
Event Window of 1 Day Before and After Announcement
Event Window of 1 Day Before and 3 Days After Announcement
Subprime Phase Global Phase28 
 
United States United Kingdom 1/ Euro area 2/ Japan
Scale of Intervention
Liability guarantees 3/ 10.9 21.7 15.8 —
Recapitalization 4/ 4.6 3.5 2.4 0.0
Asset purchases 5/ 13.4 26.9 1.1 —
Total 28.9 52.1 19.3 0.0
Impact
Liability guarantees Subprime/Global Subprime/Global Global —
2.4/9.1 -27.6/15.4 8.8 —
Recapitalizations Global Global Global Global
-1.6 5.5 2.0 -3.0
Asset purchases Subprime/Global Global — —
4.2/4.9 -1.1 -7.3 —
Structural Factors
Banking sector assets 111.0 456.0 302.7 161.8
Capital market size 347.4 276.1 365.2 495.7
Financial sector concentration. (HHI 7/) 859.6 1453.8 2894.9 717.6
Fiscal Position
Central govt. net borrowing (in percent of debt 8/) 24.5 26.3 9.0 n.a.
Sovereign CDS spread change (in percent) 28.0 87.6 49.9 42.9
Source: Authors' estimates. 
1/ These numbers were obtained from the Bank of England (2009).
2/ GDP-weighted composite of Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain.
Note: Percentage of GDP calculated using WEO projections of GDP in 2008 in US dollars. "—" indicates that the measure was not used. "n.a." indicates that data is not 
available.
3/ Includes guarantees on bond issuance, interbank lending, and other wholesale liabilities (In USD billions) according to the announced package unless specified otherwise. 
Guarantees on assets of financial institutions are excluded (such as in the case of Japan). For the United States, included are bank guarantees under the FDIC Temporary 
Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP) for new bank debt and certain checking and other non-interest bearing accounts (up to US$1.45 trillion), the FDIC guarantee to Citigroup 
(US$10 billion), as well as other guarantees to non-banks and non-financial institutions. However, the Hope for Homeowners Program (up to US$1 billion) and the Temporary 
Guarantee for Money Market Funds (up to US$3 trillion) are not considered.
4/ Refers to the actual capital committed under announced packages (In USD billions). The estimates for the United States do not include the total cost of support measures 
outside the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) unless specified. So far, US$127 billion of TARP funds (US$700 billion) have been allocated for capital injections. Other 
capital injections considered include the Capital Purchase Program (up to US$218 billion), the Systemically Significant Failing Institutions Program (US$70 billion), the Targeted 
Investment Program (US$40 billion) and the conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (up to US$200 billion). However, all crisis liquidity facilities and direct lending are 
excluded: TSLF (up to US$200 bilion), AMLF (US$23.6 billion), TAF (up to US$600 billion), TALF (up to US$1 trillion), CPFF (up to US$1.8 trillion), MMIFF (up to US$540 billion), 
loan commitments under the Home Affordable Modification Program (US$50 billion), Unlocking SBA Lending Markets (US$15 billion), Automotive Industry Financing Program 
(US$30 billion), programs of the National Credit Union Administration (up to US$41 billion), as well as loans of up to US$60 billion to AIG, US$234 billion to Citigroup, and US$87 
5/ This excludes general asset purchases in capital markets, such as the purchase of bank stocks (Japan). For the United States, US$100 billion of TARP funds have been 
allocated for asset protection under the Private-Public Investment Program (PPIP). In addition, the following measures are included: GSE MBS and debt purchases (up to 
US$1.45 trillion), AIG assets (up to US$53 billion), Bear Stearns' assets (US$29 billion), as well as US$314 billion under the GSE MBS Purchase Program.
6/ "Subprime" (06/01/07-09/13/08), "Global" (09/14/08-3/31/09). The number below the crisis sub-period label show the ratio between the cumul. average abnormal change of the 
respective type of financial sector policy and the amplitude of the LIBOR-OIS spread over the subperiod. A bolded number indicates statistical significance (parametric and non-
parametric) of at least 10 percent during the respective period.
7/ Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI): S(market share of firmi)^2 based on the market capitalization of all financial sector firms in each country as of June 7, 2009.
8/ Fitch Ratings (2009) and Moody's (2009a and 2009b).
Table 4. Characteristics and Impact of Financial Sector Policy Measures
(In percent of GDP)
(In percent of periodic amplitude of LIBOR-OIS spread 6/)

































Fiscal policy ↑ ——↑↑ ↑ ↑ ↓
*
Interest rate cuts ↓ — ↓ ↑ ↓↑ ↓ ↓
Quantitative and credit easing — — — — — — — —
Domestic currency support ↑↑ — ↓






Recapitalization — — — — — — — —








Increase of interest rates ↑ ——↑↓ ↓ ↓ ↑








Ad hoc bank bailouts ↑↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
* ↑
* ↑
Fiscal policy surprises — — — — — — — —















Quantitative and credit easing ↑↑ ↓ ↓ ↑ ↓
*** ↓↑
Domestic currency support ↓
* ↓↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↑
Forex swaps ↑↑ ↓
* ↓










* ↓↑ ↓ ↓
Increase of interest rates — — — — — — — —










Fiscal policy surprises ↑↓ ↑
*** ↓ ↑
* ↓↓ ↑






3/ Controlling for expectations over the 20 day pre-event window.
4/ Based on the 3-month government bond yield.
5/ The TED spread is defined as the difference between the LIBOR rate and the risk free rate at a maturity term of 3 months.
7/ See IMF (2009b) for the further details on the CDS and equity composites.
8/ Data on market expectations regarding financial sector policies were insufficient for comparable analysis.
6/ VIX is a Volatility Index, created by the Chicago Board Options Exchange as a measure of equity market volatility. The computation of VIX is based on the implied 
volatility of eight option series on the S&P 100 index, or OEX. VIX is quoted in percent per annum.
Financial sector 
policy
Policy inaction and 




1/ In contrast to LIBOR, which represents a quote of the benchmark rate of interest at which banks can expect to lend funds to each other in the London interbank 
market, the New York Funding Rate (NYFR) is the representative transaction rate at which an institution would be likely to obtain funding in the market. The NYFR was 
launched on June 11, 2008 by the inter-dealer brokerage ICAP in response to market concerns about the accuracy of the LIBOR fixing and the panel composition of 
contributing banks.
Note: An arrow "↑" ("↓") indicates an increase (decrease) of the corresponding market indicator. "―" denotes that no observations were available due to the absence  of 
such policy measure or the late sample starting date (for example, for the New York Funding Rate and the Libor-OIS futures rates). Asterisks ***,**,* indicate statistical 
significance (two-tailed, standard normal distribution) at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level based on the parametric and nonparametric tests. Statistical significance is 
assigned if all parametric and non-parametric tests are consonant with each other at the significance level of at least 10 percent; the lowest value of the test statistics is 
used. 
2/ The difference between the current Libor-OIS spread and the forward contract on the Libor-OIS spread, 3-month contract. A positive difference between the two 
indicates elevated liquidity and credit risks in the future compared to the present.
Liquidity support






Policy inaction and 








United States United Kingdom Euro Area Japan United States United Kingdom Euro Area Japan
— US US,UK US JP EU JP US
Interest rate cuts o o o o UK,JP EU,JP JP EU,UK
Quant./credit easing o— o o oo U K , J P U K
Domestic currency oo o o oo o o
Forex swap lines EU o o o — — — —
Recapitalization o o UK o EU US, JP US,UK US
Asset purchases —o o o o E U o E U
Liability guarantees UK US UK US o US US o
o JP US,UK US EU US UK US
Source: Authors' estimates.
Table 6. Statistical Significance of Foreign Policy Announcements on the Libor-OIS Spreads
Monetary policy
Note: Abbreviated country names ("US" for the United States, "UK" for the United Kingdom, "EU" for the euro area, and "JP" for Japan) indicate statistically significant spillover effects 
of domestic policies on the corresponding country, based on bilateral country analyses. The column headers are the countries which received spillovers. The country abbreviations in 
cells indicate the countries where spillovers originated. Italics indicate an increase in the Libor-OIS spreads due to bilateral spillovers, and the regular font means a decrease. Borders 
show statistically significant spillovers from all foreign announcements. The solid-line borders indicate a reduction of the Libor-OIS spreads, while the dashed-line borders mean an 
increase. "o" indicates that spillovers were statistically insignificant. "―" means that spillovers were not feasible, i.e., foreign announcements in the respective policy category did not 
occur or did not qualify as a front-page event.
Global Phase







Figure 1. The 3-month Libor-OIS Spreads, in Levels and First Differences, in the United States, United 
Kingdom, Euro Area, and Japan, January 1, 2007–March 31, 2009
(In basis points)
Source: Bloomberg and authors' estimates.
Note: Thick lines refer to the level of the Libor-OIS spreads and thin lines to the first differences. The 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2. Cumulative Number of Front-Page Policy Announcements
June 1, 2007–March 31, 2009
 33 
 
Figure 3. Impact of Policy Announcements on the Libor-OIS Spread, 
June 1, 2007–March 31, 2009
(In basis points)
Source: Authors' estimates.
Note: The variable plotted on the vertical axis is the average cumulative abnormal differences in basis 
points within the event window of one day before the event and three days after the event. The 
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Subprime  Global 
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Note: The variable plotted on the horizontal axis is the average cumulative abnormal differences 
(ACAD), in basis points, within the window of one day before the event and three days after the event. 
The vertical axis shows density, in percent. The kernel density is estimated using Epanechnikov 
kernel and linear binning. The bandwidth is set to 2.5 to minimize the asymptotic mean integrated 
squared error compared to the reference (Epanechnikov) distribution. The category "policy actions" 
includes all types of policy announcements, except policy inaction and ad hoc bank bailouts and 
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Figure 5. Time Profile of the Response of the Libor-OIS Spread to Policy 
Announcements (In basis points)
Source: Authors' estimates.
Note: The figure shows average cumulative abnormal differences (ACAD) within the window of one 
day before the announcement and three days after the announcement, aggregated for each quarter 
over the sample time period (Q3 2007 to Q4 2009). Analysis is performed on the pooled sample of all 
country announcements and the U.S. dollar 3-month Libor-OIS spread. The red screens indicate the 
quarter within which the collapse of Lehman Bros. occurred. Data for fiscal and monetary policy 


















































































































Figure 6. Magnitude and Statistical Significance of the Libor-OIS Spread Response 
to Policy Announcements (Pooled Sample)
Source: Authors' estimates.
Note: The figure shows the contribution of different types of policy announcements to the overall 
impact of announcements in the respective policy category, in basis points. The contribution of each 
type of announcement is calculated according to the equation (10) in Appendix I, as the average 
cumulative abnormal differences (ACAD) for the respective type of announcement, scaled by the 
ACAD of the respective category of policy announcement, both within the window of 1 day before the 
announcement and 3 days after the announcement. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10 
percent level or less. Data for fiscal and monetary policy surprises cover the United States and the 
United Kingdom only.  
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Figure 7. Impact of Policy Announcements on the NYFR-OIS Spread, 
June 1, 2007–March 31, 2009
(In basis  points)
Source: Authors' estimates.
Note: The variable plotted on the vertical axis is the average cumulative abnormal 
differences in basis points within the event window of one day before the event and three 
days after the event. The horizontal axis shows days within the event window, with "0" 
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Figure 8. Impact of Policy Announcements on the TED Spread, 
June 1, 2007–March 31, 2009
(In basis  points)
Source: Authors' estimates.
Note: The variable plotted on the vertical axis is the average cumulative abnormal 
differences in basis points within the event window of one day before the event and three 
days after the event. The horizontal axis shows days within the event window, with "0" 
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Figure 9. Impact of Policy Announcements on Alternative Measures of Financial 
Distress, June 1, 2007–March 31, 2009
(In basis  points)
Source: Authors' estimates.
Note: The variable plotted on the vertical axis is the median value of the average 
cumulative abnormal differences in basis points across five alternative measures  of market 
response (TED spread, NYFR-OIS spread, repo-riskfree rate spread, LIBOR-OIS  futures 
spread, and CDS spread composite of sample countries. The grey shaded area shows the 
inter-quartile range (IQR) of values between the 25th and 75th percentile. The horizontal 














































































































Policy intervention Inaction, failures & bailouts
Figure 10. Impact of Domestic and Foreign Policy Announcements on the 
Libor-OIS Spread, June 1, 2007–March 31, 2009 (by Country)
(In basis points)
Source: Authors' estimates.
Note: The variable plotted on the vertical axis is the average cumulative abnormal 
differences (ACAD) in basis points within the event window of one day before the 
announcement and three days after the announcement.  The horizontal axis shows days 
within the event window, with "0" corresponding to the day of the announcement. 
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Liability guarantees and deposit insurance
Asset purchases
Recapitalizations
Global Phase Subprime Phase
Figure 11. Magnitude and Statistical Significance of the Libor-OIS Spread 
Response to Domestic and Foreign Policy Announcements (by Country)
(In basis points)
Domestic Announcements  Foreign Announcements 
Monetary Policy and Liquidity Support
Financial Sector Policy
Source: Authors' estimates.
Note: The figures show the contribution of different types of policy announcements to the 
overall impact of announcements in the respective policy category by country, in basis 
points. The contribution of each type of announcement is calculated according to the 
equation (10) in Appendix I, as the average cumulative abnormal differences (ACAD) for 
the respective type of announcement, scaled by the ACAD of the respective category of 
policy announcement, both within the window of 1 day before the announcement  and 3 
days after the announcement.  Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent 
level or less. 
 42 
 
Figure 12. Magnitude and Statistical Significance of the Libor-OIS Spread 
Response to Domestic and Foreign Policy Inaction and Ad Hoc Bank Bailouts 
(by Country)
Source: Authors' estimates.
Note: The figures show the contribution of different types of policy announcements to the 
overall impact of announcements in the respective policy category by country, in basis 
points. The contribution of each type of announcement is calculated according to the 
equation (10) in Appendix I, as the average cumulative abnormal differences (ACAD) for 
the respective type of announcement, scaled by the ACAD of the respective category of 
policy announcement, both within the window of 1 day before the announcement  and 3 
days after the announcement.  Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent 
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Appendix: Statistical Tests 
 
We use parametric and nonparametric tests of means to judge whether the given type of 
policy announcement induced a significant market response. The tests examine abnormal 
changes of the Libor-OIS spread over a short period of time before and after each policy 
announcement—the  event window. The abnormal difference is computed as a difference 
between the expected daily change of the market indicator and its actual daily change, under 
an assumption that no other factors moved the Libor-OIS spread in the short run. Next, the 
day-to-day abnormal differences are aggregated throughout the event window, forming the 
cumulative abnormal differences. These differences are averaged across the same type of 
policy measure to estimate the average cumulative abnormal differences (ACAD) during 
each crisis phase.  
Appendix 1: Parametric Tests 
The parametric test statistic is a t-statistic with three different measures of historical volatility 
of the Libor-OIS spread over an estimation period of 20 days before the event window. This 
allows us to restrict the statistical significance only to those observations that were truly 
exceptional even at a time of large changes in the Libor-OIS spread prior to the policy event. 
The first estimator of volatility is based on Wayne H. Mikkelson and Megan M. Partch 
(1986) and equals to the square root of the sum of squared differences. This implies that the 
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where  [ ] 1,3 τ ∈−  denotes a day within the event window (with the event occurring at  0 = τ ), 
5 = T  denotes the total length of the event window of 5 days,  [ ] 20, 1 l ττ ∈ −−  denotes a day 
within the pre-event estimation window,  20 = L  denotes the total length of the pre-event 
estimation window of 20 days, m denotes a type of crisis interventions, and N denotes the 
number of events of type m in our sample. Abnormal differences are generally defined as the 
daily changes  m i m i m i x x AD , 1 , , , , , − − = τ τ τ  of an market stress variable x in response to policy 
announcement i of category m on event time day τ.
4 For the baseline results, we assume that 
this test statistic asymptotically converges to the standard normal distribution Φ(.). We also 
                                                 
4 As discussed in the preceding section, averages during the pre-event window are zero for changes in the 
Libor-OIS spread and nonzero for other indicators.  
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examine statistical significance based on the generalized extreme value distribution  () . G  
which accounts for excess skewness and kurtosis of abnormal differences.
5  
 
The second estimator of volatility is also drawn on Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and equals 
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This is a more balanced specification of volatility during the estimation window than the one 
given by (A1). 
 
The third estimator of volatility is based on the expected prediction error that is derived from 
a simple autoregressive process and is adjusted by the ratio between volatility during both the 
estimation window and the event window. This accounts for changes in volatility on a day-
to-day basis relative to the empirical experience within a short event window. Such 
specification is particularly relevant for cases when a policy measure was anticipated by 
markets and had an effect on the Libor-OIS spread before the event window. To calculate 
this test statistic, we first derive a measure of the standard deviation  
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where  , il ε  denotes the ordinary prediction error of the AR(1) process of the Libor-OIS spread 
at first differences subject. Following Brown and Warner (1985), we obtain the (daily) 
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5 We calibrate a generalized extreme value distribution (GEV) as a means to capture asymptotic tail behavior at 
percentiles far removed from central observations. GEV prescribes that there exists a choice of constants 
0 n a >  and  n b , such that the probability of a n-sequence of normalized maxima  [] ()
+ nn ax b
n Fx  converges to the 






exp 1 Gx x  as n →∞ and x ∈  , after adjustment 
of scale parameter  0 σ > , location parameter μ  and the shape parameter ξ , which indicates the velocity of 




and then derive the average standardized interval prediction error (ASIPE) as 
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as our test statistic.  
Appendix 2: Nonparametric Tests 
Given the weak power of parametric tests in small samples of events with diverse effects on 
market indicators, we use nonparametric tests to remove priors about the distribution of 
abnormal differences from the measure of statistical significance. Based on Charles J. 
Corrado and Terry L. Zivney (1992), a standard sign test determines whether the incidence of 
positive or negative responses to a particular type of policy measure is statistically significant 
under normality: 













+ denotes the number of cumulative abnormal differences (CAD) that exhibit the 
desired direction of market response every time a policy of type m is announced. However, 
such a test statistic captures only the dominant direction of market response and ignores the 
relative magnitude of market response in either direction.  
 
To control for such relative market response, we introduce the sign-size test. It provides for a 
high degree of asymmetry in the magnitude of individual market responses to different types 
of announcements. In this test a given announcement type would be deemed statistically 
significant only if there is a positive market response (in the sense of a decline in the Libor-
OIS spread), which, on average, is larger than any negative response to the same type of 
policy measure over the sample time period.  
 
We control for the size of standardized   CAD, which transforms equation (6) into the test 
statistic of the sign-size test: 
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scales to unity all  i CAD
+ and  i CAD
− of individual counts of positive (i.e., Libor-OIS spread 
reducing) and negative (i.e., Libor-OIS spread increasing) market responses to a particular 
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which determines at which point the standardized   CAD indicates a positive or negative 
market response. 
 
We apply the above statistical tests in (1)–(3), (5) and (6) to individual types and categories 
of announcements. In addition, we examine the contribution of each type to the overall 
impact of the respective broad policy category M, such as monetary policy, financial sector 
support, or policy inaction and ad hoc bank bailouts. For example, we calculate contribution 
of recapitalization announcements to the overall impact of announcements about financial 
sector measures. Since the tests are performed separately for each type and category of policy 
announcement, the analysis of contributions requires scaling the impact of individual types of 
announcements, especially if the constituent policy measures triggers opposite market 
responses on average. The scaled absolute contribution of an individual type of policy 
announcement m to the impact of the respective policy category is defined as 
 





























where  m M ACAD
+ ∑  and  m M ACAD
− ∑  denote the sum of all positive and negative ACADs 
associated with the individual types of policy measures that make up the broader policy 
category M. 